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: Subsaharan Africa

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION VISA-VIS NATIONAL SECURITY:
THE NEED TO STRIKE THE BALANCE IN EASTERN AFRICA

With increasing security threats, Eastern
African nations are at the crossroads of balancing national security and freedom of expression.
The volatile geopolitics of the region may generally justify a broader margin of appreciation in
favor of national security. However, if that discretion is abused, it becomes counterproductive
as a systemic suppression of freedoms may be a
national security threat in itself, especially in a
region characterized by porous borders, ethnic
and religious diversity, and secessionist tendencies and realities.
In December 2014, the Kenyan Parliament passed the Security Laws (Amendment)
Bill, which amends about twenty-one existing
parliamentary acts. Human rights activists and
Kenyan opposition consider the bill "draconian:'
It introduces a new section to the National Intelligence Services Act to grant the Director-General the power to authorize mass surveillance of
communications for national security purposes.
The bill also adds a section to the Prevention of
Terrorism Act to criminalize the publication of
photographs of victims of terrorist attacks without the consent of the National Police Service
and the victim.
The Kenyan Government considers the bill
a response to recurring terrorist attacks from AlShabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group based in
neighboring Somalia. Since 2010, the group has
taken responsibility for multiple attacks, including bombings in Kampla, Uganda; the attack on
Westgate mall in 2013, and a 2014 attack that
killed 28 in Kenya.
In 2009, Ethiopia passed an anti-terrorism
law based on similar justifications. According to
United Nations experts and other rights groups,
the Ethiopian Government is using the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation to suppress various

rights, including freedom of expression, by
prosecuting "journalists, bloggers, and opposition politicians:' Meanwhile, some claim that
Ethiopia experienced fewer attacks after the new
law took effect, and have been advising Kenya to
learn from Ethiopia. The United Kingdom has
insisted that Kenya pass a tight anti-terrorism
law since 2011.
The debate over the Kenyan bill highlights
the fundamental challenge of balancing freedoms and national security in the region. Unstable geopolitical situation may provide nations
with a broader margin of discretion in favoring
their security. However, the discretion is not
unlimited under international human rights law.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which all eastern African
nations except South Sudan are parties, provides
for the right to freedom of expression under
Article 19, but recognizes national security as a
legitimate justification to restrict the freedom.
Ensuring national security is a fundamental
precondition to safeguard human rights including freedom of expression. National security
may be invoked in response to situations that
may threaten the existence of a nation, its territorial integrity, or its political independence.
However, restrictions based on security interests
must have a genuine purpose and demonstrable
effect of protecting national security. It may not
be invoked to impose arbitrary restrictions or
perpetuate systematic violation of human rights.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee
General Comment 34 also calls for strict adherence to the tests of necessity and proportionality.
Nations have a general discretion to define
what constitutes a national security threat. In
east Africa, territorial integrity may be a key
interest for several reasons. Firstly, the region
is arguably one of world's most volatile. The
region witnessed two recent successful secessionist movements leading to the creation of
Eritrea and South Sudan. Neither movement
delivered the freedoms they promised. Rather,
Eritrea is considered by some to be state sponsor
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of terrorism, and civil war is still waging South
Sudan. Secondly, in the region is also war-torn
Somalia, which has been referred to as a "failed
State;' where groups such as Al-Shabaab and Al
Ittihad al Islamiya are based. Additionally, the
fact that nations in region share porous borders
with similar ethnic demographics, languages, or
religion may enhance adjacent countries' real or
perceived susceptibility to security concerns.
Counterterrorism may unavoidably be
incompatible with human rights as fighting terrorism "necessarily involves the state taking on
new powers of surveillance and enforcement:'
However, states need to act in good faith taking
into account the exigencies of the situation as required by the Siracusa and Johannesburg Principles on limiting freedoms. States need to recognize that systematic violations of human rights
by themselves may ultimately lead to national
security threats. It is important to note that the
secessionist movements that created Eritrea and
South Sudan were responses to grave human
rights situations in the respective nations.
It may be difficult to tailor the actual breadth
of security laws in advance of the situations they
purport to govern. Thus, the guiding principle
should be that laws too suppressive of freedom
of expression are national security threats in
themselves.
BEYOND THE ELECTION OF MUGABE AS AFRICAN UNION CHAIR

On January 30, 2015, African leaders appointed Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe
as the African Union's (AU) next Chair. The
ninety year-old Mugabe took the one "year-long
rotating chairmanship" succeeding Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The
Union elected Mugabe amidst allegations of human rights abuses by his regime, and longstanding travel bans and sanctions by the European
Union and the United States. The post, though
ceremonial, may implicate the Union's position
of non-interference vis-a-vis human rights.
Following the nomination of Mugabe by the
Southern African Development Community
(SADC), which he also chairs until August 2015,

the Union's senior officials expressed contrasting
views on approving the appointment. While
the AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana
Dlamini-Zuma emphasized the Union's goals
to be "democracy, good governance and human
rights;' her deputy Erastus Mwencha enquired:
"Who am I to say to the people, you have elected
the wrong leader?"
In 2007, the Union faced a similar dilemma
on the candidacy of Sudanese President Omar
Al-Bashir in connection with the Darfur crisis.
Instead, the Union elected Ghanaian President
John Kufuor on the ground that his nation was
celebrating its golden jubilee of independence.
In other situations, the Union welcomed
to the same post Libya's Muammar Gaddafi in
2009 and Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang
Nguema Mbasogo in 2011, despite objections
from civil society groups.
Mugabe's election may have human rights
implications despite the symbolic nature of the
post. Firstly, the Union may be regressing to
the "sacrosanct" principles of state sovereignty
and non-interference; core principles before the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) transformed itself into the AU in 2002. These principles were very instrumental during the fight
for independence from colonialism. With this
transformation, non-interference was supposed
to be overridden by emerging values such as
human rights.
Secondly, Mugabe's election, about which
Western and African opinions sharply contrast,
may intensify the Union's anti-neocolonial rhetoric. While there is pessimism as to the value
Mugabe will add, there is also deep respect and
support for him among many African leaders.
In one-way or another, his election may further strengthen the Union's re-emerging principle of non-interference at the expense of other
values such as human rights.
By Bantayehu Demlie Gezahegn, staff writer
DOMINIC 0NGWEN-ICC TO
PROSECUTE LRA LEADER

On Tuesday, January 6, 2015, a man claiming
to be Dominic Ongwen, one of the Lord's Resis-
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tance Army's (LRA) top commanders, surrendered to United States military forces in Central
African Republic. The following day Ugandan
authorities confirmed his identity and explained
that U.S. forces where holding him at a military base in Obo. Ongwen's capture gave rise
to controversy regarding the jurisdiction under
which he would be prosecuted-the options
being Uganda's own courts or the International
Criminal Court (ICC). However, on January
13, a State Department deputy spokeswoman
announced, and the Ugandan Army confirmed,
that Ongwen would be transferred to the Hague
for prosecution under the ICC, who indicted
Ongwen in 2005 on seven counts, including
murder and enslavement. At first Uganda appeared reluctant to release Ongwen to the ICC,
wishing to prosecute him in the country's own
courts instead. Uganda could have exercised its
right to prosecute Ongwen because-despite
the ICC's jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes-it is a court
of last resort, meaning "it will not act if a case is
investigated or prosecuted by a national judicial system, unless the national proceedings are
not genuine:' Uganda has pardoned thousands
of LRA fighters under a 2000 Amnesty Law
and some feared that Ongwen's "status as both
victim and alleged author of war crimes" could
have resulted in such a pardon.
At the ICC, Dominic Ongwen will be prosecuted for his role as a top commander in the
LRA, where he served under the group's leader
Joseph Kony. Ongwen is charged with crimes
against humanity, specifically murder and enslavement. According to Article 7(l)(a) ofICC's
Elements of Crimes, in order to prove murder
the ICC prosecution will have to show that ( 1)
Ongwen has "killed one or more persons;' (2)
that his "conduct was committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population;' and (3) that he "knew the
conduct was part of or intended the conduct
to be part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population:' To prove that Ongwen is guilty of enslavement under Article 7(1)
(c), the prosecution must show that (1) Ongwen
"exercised any or all of the powers attaching to

the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or
bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty;' as
well as evidence proving the same components
(2) and (3) stated above.
The prosecution may be able to prove the
last two elements of both murder and enslavement. The LRA is allegedly to blame for the
mass killings of over 100,000 people, and the
kidnapping of over 60,000 children. Their acts
spanned over a period of thirty years, and occurred across five central African countries. The
LRA was forced out of Uganda almost ten years
ago for their cruel acts against humanity, such
as chopping off prisoners' limbs and abducting
young women for sex slavery. Such information
suggests that Ongwen's conduct as an LRA commander was "part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population:'
In order for the ICC to find Ongwen guilty
of his alleged crimes, the prosecution will need
to provide proof of specific instances where
Ongwen murdered and deprived civilians of
their liberties. A conviction would be, according
to Human Rights Watch, an opportunity for victims of the LRA to receive long-awaited justice
for the grievances they have suffered.
AL-SHABAB's ATTACK ON GARISSA AND KENYAN RESPONSE

On April 2, 2015, four armed gunmen attacked the campus of Garissa University College
in northeastern Kenya. By nightfall, the death
toll, as reported by the Kenyan government,
had reached 147 people. The same night, Joseph
Nkaissery, the Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for
Interior and National Coordination, announced
that the Kenyan security forces had killed the
four gunmen involved in the attack.
Al-Shabab, the Somalia-based fighter Islamist group responsible for the attack on West
Gate Mall in 2013, claimed responsibility for
this attack. The group was also responsible for
"two attacks in Mandera county in late 2014, in
which a total of 64 people were killed;' as well
as other smaller attacks. According to the New
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York Times, "the Shabab has killed hundreds of
Kenyans-on country buses, in churches, in a
quarry last year where they marched off miners
before dawn and also made them lie face down
in rows:' These attacks have been especially
prevalent since October 2011, mainly as retaliation for Kenya's military troops entering Somalia
to fight against al-Shabab.
Survivors of the attack on Garissa claim that
the gunmen urged students to step out of their
dormitories if they wished to survive, claiming
that the alternative was death. However, the
gunmen allegedly began shooting students as
they flooded out, or forced students to lay down
in rows where they proceeded to execute them
with gunshots to the head. Some survivors also
recounted instances where the attackers ordered
students to call their parents and make it known
that this attack was in response to "Kenya's
military intervention in Somalia:' Although it
appears that most students were killed indiscriminately, the majority of the victims are said
to be non-Muslims.
The condemnation of al-Shabab's acts were
unanimous-even a group of ethnic Somali men
"marched down Garissa's main road to show
solidarity with the victims:' In the wake of the
attack, there appears to be growing resentment
of the Kenyan government. Despite the impending possibility of such attacks, the security at
Garissa University was minimal, comprised of
only two guards. Human Rights Watch (HRW)
also argues that "Kenya's efforts to tackle rising
insecurity have been marred by serious human
rights violations:" limited freedom of expression, "extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture by
security forces:'
Articles 48 through 51 of the Kenyan Constitution ensure that all persons have access to
justice and that their rights to due process are
upheld. Articles 6 and 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
of which Kenya is a state party, prohibits the
arbitrary deprivation of life, and torture, respectively. Although Article 4 of the ICCPR acknowledges a country's need to employ certain
extreme measures "in time of public emergency

which threatens the life of the nation;' it clearly
states that there should never be any derogation
from Articles 6 and 7, among others.
Deputy Africa Director of HRW, Leslie Lefkow, understands the "shock and anger" caused
by the Garissa attack. However, he argues that
"law enforcement operations that respect Kenyan and international law are essential" to preserving basic human rights, especially those of
the Muslim and ethnic Somali persons against
whom Kenyan police and soldiers are discriminating. Further, given Garissa's proximity to
Somalia, the Kenyan government was aware of
the city's and university's "vulnerability to [al]Shabab attacks;' yet it "failed to appropriately
address" this weakness. ''Amnesty International
emphasizes the Kenyan government's responsibility to guarantee the human rights of all its citizens within the boundaries of the Constitution
and the law;' which includes safe educational
institutions for its students and teachers.
By Stefania Butoi Varga, staff writer
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AHEAD
OF BURUNDI'S 2015 ELECTIONS

On April 15, 2015, the United Nations (UN)
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid
Ra'ad Al Hussein, referred to Burundi's 2015
general elections as a "critical moment" in the
nation's history with a chance for the country to
choose "the path of free and fair elections which
would strengthen and mature Burundi's still
fragile democracy, and enable an improvement
in its dire socio-economic situation:' However,
since then, violent demonstrations have claimed
the lives of at least twenty-seven people. The
fighting erupted after the country's ruling party,
the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy
(CNDD-FDD), nominated President Pierre
Nkurunziza on April 26, 2015, as its presidential
candidate for a third term, a move that some
Burundians say violates the country's constitution and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement. Supporters, however, argue that
Nkurunziza's candidacy violates neither law be-
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cause the parliament elected Nkurunziza to his
first term, not the people. Discontent surrounding the election has continued to mount.
On May 14, 2015, violence continued after
an attempted coup organized by a group of
military officers failed. Although officials arrested several officers purportedly involved in
the coup, the whereabouts of the group's leader, Godefroid Niyombara, remain unknown.
Following the coup attempt, public protests
resumed on May 18 in Bujumbura despite the
government's threat of arresting demonstrators
as "accomplices" to the attempted overthrow. Although the government stated in a press release
that it would not take revenge, its actions seem
to demonstrate otherwise. According to a report
by the UN, hundreds of people remain detained
in extremely overcrowded conditions "with
detainees having to sleep standing up:' The UN
Refugee Agency estimates that over 100,000 Burundians have fled the country as a result of the
pre-election violence, seeking refuge across the
borders of Rwanda, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The violence has prompted international
concerns over the Burundian government's protection of fundamental human rights including
freedom of expression and the right to peaceful
assembly, rights guaranteed under Articles 19
and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and Articles 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Since
the onset of demonstrations, there has been a
"communications clampdown'' in the country,
with the government blocking social media
platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Viber, and
Whatsapp, as well as independent radio stations.
Adama Dieng, the UN Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide, noted, "the absence of
independent voices through non-State media
was contributing to tensions:' During his recent
visit to the country, the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights stressed that "criticism is a vital element of democracy, not a threat that must
be crushed. The right to freedom of expression
and opinion is enshrined in international treaties ratified by Burundi, and the Government is
obliged to uphold those treaties:'

Furthermore, the alleged use oflive ammunition by government security forces during
protests prompted the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights to urge authorities to fully comply with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials. The principles call upon
security officials to employ nonviolent means
before resorting to any use of force, and to only
employ force when appropriate in proportion to
the seriousness of the offense, or when strictly
unavoidable to protect life. The African Union's
Peace and Security Council has also adopted a
resolution condemning "any attempt to seize
power by force" and stressing "the imperative for
all Burundian stakeholders to settle their differences through peaceful means:' In addition, the
European Union has suspended $2.3 million aid
to Burundi unless "conditions for a free, peaceful and credible election are secured:'
In response to the violence, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has urged Burundi's government "to uphold the human rights
of all Burundians, including the freedoms of
assembly, association and expression, and to
take concrete steps to prevent political killings
and violence:' In a separate statement, the UN
Security Council recalled its "intent to respond"
to violent acts that undermine peace and security in the country. The United States has
advised President Nkurunziza to renounce his
candidacy. John Kirby, a spokesperson for the
U.S. Department of State echoed this sentiment
by stating, "President Nkurunziza's decision to
disregard the term limit provision of the Arusha Accords has destabilized Burundi and the
sub-region, triggered violence, and endangered
Burundi's economic well-being:'
Although the coup attempt ultimately
failed, Burundi's future stability remains unclear, sparking rumors of another civil war in a
country with a longstanding history of political
unrest. Despite the opposition parties' demand
to President Nkurunziza to renounce his thirdterm bid, whether he will continue to run in the
election remains tentative.
By Andrea Flynn-Schneider,
Social Media Editor

